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JURY REVIEW AFTER REEVES V.
SANDERSON PLUMBING PRODUCTS, INC.:

A

FOUR-STEP ALGORITHM
David Crump*

ROFESSOR Dorsaneo called me soon after the Supreme Court
decided Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.' He said it
was an important decision. He wanted to make sure that we inserted it into our casebook. 2 I hope he was right.
The trouble is, the significance of Reeves depends upon the eagerness
of trial and appellate judges to follow it. Review of jury findings is fact
specific, and a judge of either the right or the left who finds the result of a
jury trial distasteful easily can bury his idiosyncratic preferences under
logical-sounding rhetoric. 3 This, in fact, is one reason my approach differs slightly from that of Professor Childress, whose otherwise interesting
critique does not resolve this human problem. 4 The temptation toward
abuse of power can only be overcome by a degree of humility that is not
characteristic of all judges. Appellate decisions that violate the Reeves
holding will not look like the stuff of Supreme Court review, and as a
practical matter, it will be impossible for the Court to enforce its decision
5
in Reeves.
There is no question, however, that Reeves gives a more coherent statement of the principles governing jury review than what we had before it
was decided. In our casebook, Reeves takes the place of two less clear
decisions: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Chamberlain,6 which reaches an
ostensibly correct result but is miserably reasoned, and Lavender v.
Kurn,7 which also reaches a satisfactory result (while telling a wonderful
story) but does not illustrate the proper use of a judgment as a matter of
law or tell us how to analyze one.
* A.B. 1966, Harvard College; J.D. 1969, University of Texas School of Law. Newell
H. Blakely Professor of Law, University of Houston.
1. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

2. David Crump, William V. Dorsaneo, III, & Rex R. Perschbacher, CASES AND
(4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter cited as Casebook].
3. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
5. The Supreme Court's role is not to correct errors in individual cases (particularly
not factual ones) but uniformly to resolve important questions of federal law. See
Casebook at 658.
6. 288 U.S. 333 (1933).
7. 327 U.S. 645 (1946).
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Chamberlain is a particularly troublesome decision because the Court
justifies its result by three types of reasoning, two of which are dubious.
The Court's first line of analysis is that plaintiff's evidence was circumstantial, and therefore, said the Court, it must give way to clear direct
evidence. 8 This is a careless statement. Strong circumstantial evidence,
such as a fingerprint, can stand up even against clear direct evidence, such
as the fingerprint owner's insistence upon alibi. Reasonable people
would agree that a jury could credit the fingerprint. Still today, however,
appellate decisions contrary to credible circumstantial inferences remain
a problem. The Court of Appeals decision in Reeves itself is an example. 9
The second reason that the Court gave for its decision in Chamberlain
was the equal inferences rule. 10 Professor Dorsaneo has given us an excellent analysis of this problematic device." The equal inferences rule
invites misapplication because it is a truism, a principle that follows as a
matter of definition. If two inferences are exactly equal, it follows logically that neither is proven by a preponderance. Thus, in a case in which
the judge can confidently say, to a mathematical certainty, that the two
possibilities that will decide the case are in precise numerical balance, so
that neither is preponderant, and that no inferences depending upon
human experience are useful, the equal inferences rule theoretically can
resolve the outcome. But this kind of case must be extremely rare, and if
it arises at all, it probably will be the product of contrivance by the parties, grown as artificially as an orchid in a greenhouse. The difficulty with
the equal inferences rule is that it does not easily confine itself to this odd
situation, and judges, if they wish to, can misapply the rule by using it to
resolve cases that depend upon human experience.' 2 In summary, the
trouble with the equal inferences rule is that it rarely is applicable but
easily transforms itself into a tool for illegal interference with proper jury
decisions.
Efforts to formulate a sound example of the equal inferences rule are
the best proof of its limitations. In Lozano v. Lozano, 13 Justice Nathan
Hecht gave us a (characteristically) well-crafted illustration: If the only
evidence we have is that the sun is at the horizon, we cannot know
whether it is sunrise or sunset. This example does indeed justify applica8. Chamberlain, 288 U.S. at 338.
9. 197 F.3d 688 (5th Cir. 1999).
10. Chamberlain, 228 U.S. at 339.
11. William V. Dorsaneo, III, Reexamining the Right to Trial by Jury, 54 SMU L. REV.
1695 (2001).
12. For example, in Chamberlain itself, the Court used the equal inferences rule to
resolve the question whether a "loud crash" came from the railroad cars at issue or from
somewhere else. Id. at 340-41. These two inferences, however, were not equal. The possibility that the crash came from the cars at issue might have been considered more probable
or less probable because of the circumstances, including the ostensibly credible testimony
that these cars were moving. The Court's reasoning might have been more sound if it
simply had labeled this inference too weak to aid substantially in reaching a
preponderance.
13. 52 S.W.3d 141, 157 (Tex. 2001).
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tion of the equal inferences rule, because there are only two possibilities,
each with an exact, mathematically precise probability of one-half.
Here is my problem with this (sound) example. Maybe there are some
cases like Justice Hecht's hypothet that arise in real courts, but few of us
have ever seen one. In real life, the jury usually will have more information because the witness will have seen the sun for a period of time, or
will have observed that heavy traffic was proceeding away from the city
rather than toward it, or will have watched half-awake people drinking
coffee. These items of information give rise to useful inferences that depend on human experience, and they show how the equal inferences rule
dissolves into a house of cards in the circumstances of actual litigation.
At the same time, judges can fudge to reach desired results in cases that
actually are within the competence of the jury by citing this rarely useful
rule even though it really does not apply.
Lavender v. Kurn furnishes a better answer, as Professor Dorsaneo explains. The jury there had to decide between two causes of death for
plaintiff's decedent: either the railroad's mail hook hit him, or he was
killed by robbers. 14 There was evidence to support both conclusions, but
neither was overwhelmingly proved. A sloppy analysis, such as that in
Chamberlain, might have declared the two inferences equal. And in a
way they are "equal," in the sense that each is believable, and there is no
logical means by which to separate them. But this is not what is meant by
the equal inferences rule, because whenever assessing varying degrees of
believability on the basis of different human experiences, it is necessary
to resolve the balance of probabilities. The inferences in fact are not
15
equal.
The Supreme Court dealt effectively with these problems in Lavender.
"It is no answer," said the Court in its famous statement, "to say that the
jury's verdict involved speculation and conjecture. '16 A measure of these
ingredients, based upon the jurors' collective experience, is precisely what
we expect the jury to add to the process. Paradoxically, unless some measure of conjecture is required to resolve the case, there is no role for a
jury. 17 If the case can be resolved from uncontested facts and logic alone,
if all that is required, for example, is to add together two items of admitted damages, then this is the type of case in which a judgment as a matter
18
of law most clearly may be granted.
The third rationale given by the Supreme Court in Chamberlain was
the only one that was useful. The testimony of the linchpin witness was
"simply incredible," if it was taken to mean that he saw the collision
14. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 654.
15. See supra note 13 for an example.
16. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 654.
17. See Casebook at 610.
18. See, e.g., Dittberner v. Bell, 558 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (rendering judgment as a matter of law on the basis of uncontested fact and
mathematical calculation).
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which the plaintiff claimed had occurred. 19 With no particular reason to
observe the movement, in darkness and heavy mist, looking at a narrow
angle over the distance of three football fields, the witness would have
found his vision obscured by the nearer of the lines of railway cars that he
claimed came into contact. 20 If an inference is logically precluded, or if it
may be discarded by reference to human experience that is not individual
but universal, a proper case arises for a judgment as a matter of law. The
useful part of Chamberlain,therefore, boils down to the idea that a judge
may set aside a jury's verdict only if reasonable minds cannot differ. But
then, we already knew this much, and the principle provides us with only
2
the most general guidance. '
Professor Dorsaneo does well at explaining how full record review can
be made compatible with deference to the jury after Reeves.2 2 Perhaps it
is useful to translate his reasoning into a set of steps for the judge to
23
follow, or an algorithm:
1. Indulge every reasonable credibility decision in favor of the jury's
verdict.
2. Credit every reasonable inference that the jury could have drawn in
support of the verdict.
3. Next, using the whole record, consider the evidence and possible
inferences against the verdict, but ignore every piece of evidence that the
jury was not required to believe and every inference that the jury was not
forced to draw.
4. Credit only those (rare) inferences against the verdict that must be
drawn because universal human experience makes them the only reasonable inferences.
This is the gist of Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Co., and it condenses
Professor Dorsaneo's explanation of that case. 24
The hardest task, of course, is contained in the italicized portion of step
3 above. Unfortunately, it is not a requirement that is emphasized in
Boeing Co. v. Shipman,25 and it is troublesome that the Fifth Circuit has
continued to cite Boeing, as Professor Dorsaneo shows, rather than relying upon the more complete statement contained in Reeves.26 Only time
will tell whether that court and others will exercise the self-restraint that
the Supreme Court now has required, and even then all we can do is
hope.
It follows that I find myself in the unhappy circumstance of disagreeing, in at least one particular, with Professor Childress's carefully written
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Chamberlain,288 U.S. at 342.
Id.
This concept is so basic that it is expressed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 50.
See supra note 14, at 1719.
See Reeves 530 U.S. pt. 111(A), at 149-51.
See supra note 14.
411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc).
See supra note 14, at 1724.
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response to Professor Dorsaneo. 27 Professor Childress is a prodigious
and able scholar, especially in the area of standards of review, making my
quibbles with his theory doubly uncomfortable. I believe, however, that
the Court got it right in Reeves when it quoted Wright and Miller, 28 and I
believe Professor Dorsaneo got the Court right when he treated that quotation as important. 29 If the jury reasonably could have disregarded a
part of the movant's evidence, reviewing judges must disregard it also. I
am concerned that what Professor Childress calls unrelenting whole-record review 30 would make judges into super-jurors, as might the power
that Fifth Circuit judges have assumed under Boeing to balance, infer,
credit, and make choices among reasonable inferences. 3 1 Instead, it is
worth emphasizing, as the algorithm above does, that the first step in a
judge's duty is restraint: to do the hard work of disregarding evidence
that the jury did not have to credit and of rejecting inferences that the
jury did not have to draw. The Wright and Miller quotation from Reeves
emphasizes this duty, and I think Professor Childress understates the Supreme Court's deliberateness when he suggests that it does not express a
true limitation 32 on whole-record review.
According to Professor Childress's critique, a court reviews the whole
record, and it evaluates the jury's verdict for "reasonableness. '33 That is
fine so far as it goes. But I am sure the Court of Appeals thought it was
doing exactly that in Reeves. And I am equally sure the lower court in
Lavender v. Kurn thought it was doing exactly that when it invalidated
the proper jury verdict in that case. Although I doubt Professor Childress
intends this, I worry that his approach might come across to courts of
appeals as a loosey-goosey standard that tells the court, "Roll it all up in a
ball and decide in a holistic way what you think is 'reasonable'." My
concern is that such a communication would not have furnished the
Reeves or Lavender judges with any meaningful guidance about the duty
not to interfere with the jury's function in the myriad of credibility determinations and inferences it typically must make. The Wright and Miller
quotation supplies at least a basis for this discipline. This is why I do not
think its inclusion by the Supreme Court was an accident.
Professor Childress also suggests that this limit might be "inconsistent"
with whole-record review. 34 Respectfully, I confess that I cannot perceive the inconsistency. The reviewing court must credit all testimony
and inferences that the jury was "required to believe," say Wright and
Miller.3 5 The reviewing court thus looks to the whole record to find those
27.
(2001).
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Steven Alan Childress, Taking Jury Verdicts Seriously, 54 SMU L.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
See supra note 14.
Childress, supra note 29, at 1740.
Again, Reeves itself is an example.
Childress, supra note 29, at 1742.
Childress, supra note 29, at 1747.
Childress, supra note 29, at 1742.
Reeves, 530 U.S. at 151.
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(rare) inferences that the jury was forced to draw. Yes, this approach
limits the judicial role. Yes, it disallows wide-ranging fact balancing by
the judiciary. But the Supreme Court in Reeves did not intend for the
judicial role to be "unqualified" or "unrelenting," even in whole-record
review. Instead, it meant for that role to be sharply limited, consistently
with the purpose of the Seventh Amendment.
In many other countries, the judge fulfills a much greater role in finding the facts. The civil law countries of the Americas and Europe are
examples. The civil law system has many benefits to commend it, and
perhaps we should consider whether to adopt ideas from it. But if we
were to adopt such a system, we would want our judges selected in a very
different way than we select them now. And the change should make us
first rethink the role of the jury. Jury trial, with its enormous expense,
followed by the kind of evidence-balancing by politically selected judges
that has resulted under Boeing, would give us the worst of both worlds.

